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Tight exponential analysis of universally
composable privacy amplification and its
applications
Masahito Hayashi Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Motivated by the desirability of universal compos-
ability, we analyze in terms of L1 distinguishability the task
of secret key generation from a joint random variable. Under
this secrecy criterion, using the Re´nyi entropy of order 1+ s for
s ∈ [0, 1], we derive a new upper bound of Eve’s distinguishability
under the application of the universal2 hash functions. It is
also shown that this bound gives the tight exponential rate of
decrease in the case of independent and identical distributions.
The result is applied to the wire-tap channel model and to secret
key generation (distillation) by public discussion.
Index Terms—sacrifice bits, L1 norm distance, universal com-
posablity, secret key distillation, universal2 hash functions, wire-
tap channel
I. INTRODUCTION
Random privacy amplification based on the universal2 con-
dition [1] has been studied by many authors [2], [3], [4], [5],
[30], [6]. This technique is originally developed for random
number extraction [2], [3]. It can also be applied to secret key
generation (distillation) with public communication [7], [8],
[9], [10], [11], [3], [4] and the wire-tap channel [12], [13],
[14], [15], [16], [17], which treats the secure communication
in the presence of an eavesdropper. (For details of its appli-
cation, see e.g. the previous paper [6].) When random privacy
amplification is implemented with universal2 hash functions, it
can yield protocols for the above tasks with a relatively small
amount of calculation.
Similar to the study [2], [30] for random privacy amplifica-
tion based on the universal2 condition, the previous paper [6]
focused only on the mutual information with the eavesdropper.
However, as the secrecy criterion, many papers in the cryp-
tography community [22], [3], [4], [5] adopt the half of the
L1 norm distance, so called L1 distinguishability because this
criterion is closely related to universally composable security
[22]. In this paper, we adopt L1 distinguishability as the
secrecy criterion, and evaluate the secrecy for random privacy
amplification. In the independent and identically distributed
case, when the rate of generated random numbers is smaller
than the entropy of the original information source, it is possi-
ble to generate a random variable whose L1 norm distance to
the uniform random number approaches zero asymptotically.
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In the realistic setting, we can manipulate only a finite size
of random variables. In order to treat the performance in the
finite length setting, we have two kinds of formalism for the
independent and identical distribution setting.
The first one is the second order formalism, in which, we
focus on the asymptotic expansion up to second order in
√
n of
the length of the generated keys ln as ln = Hn+C
√
n+o(
√
n)
with a constant constraint for the security parameter. The
second one is the exponent formalism, in which, we fix
the generation rate R := ln/n and evaluate the exponential
decreasing rate of convergence of the security parameter. In
the exponent formalism, it is not sufficient to show that the
security parameter goes zero exponentially, and it is required to
explicitly give lower and/or upper bounds for the exponential
decreasing rate. The exponent formalism has been studied by
various information theoretical settings, e.g., channel coding
[20], [35], source coding [19], [31], and mutual information
criterion in wire-tap channel [17], [6]. As for the second
order formalism, the optimal coding length with the fixed
error probability has been derived up to the second order√
n in various settings [36], [37], [38] in the case of channel
coding. In particular, the previous paper [37] treats it based
on the information spectrum approach [32], which is closely
related to ǫ-smooth min-entropy. Note that, as is mentioned by
Han [32], the information spectrum approach cannot yield the
optimal exponent of error probability in the channel coding.
Concerning the second order formalism for uniform random
number generation, the previous paper [25] has solved the
optimal second order coefficient under L1 distinguishability
criterion and other criteria by employing the information
spectrum method when there is no side information. Even
when the side information exists, the same argument can
be shown for the second order formalism by replacing the
variance of the likelihood by the variance of the likelihood for
the conditional distribution due to the following reason. For
the converse part, the key lemma ([25, Lemma 4],[32, Lemma
2.1.2]) holds by replacing the distribution by the conditional
distribution. The direct part can be shown by replacing the key
lemma ([25, Lemma 3],[32, Lemma 2.1.1]) by the inequality
(32) in the present paper, which holds under the universal2
hash functions.
However, the exponent formalism for L1 distinguishability
with secure key generation has not been studied sufficiently.
Only the previous paper [6] treated it with mutual information
criterion. Therefore, the present paper focuses on the exponent
formalism for L1 distinguishability.
2In Section III, first, we focus on evaluation for random
privacy amplification by Bennett et al [2], which employs the
Re´nyi entropy of order 2. This evaluation was also obtained
by Ha˚stad et al [30] and is often called leftover hash lemma.
Using a discussion similar to Renner [5], we derive an upper
bound for the L1 norm distance under the universal2 condition
for hash functions, which is the main theorem of this paper
(Theorem 1).
Next, we apply this theorem to the i.i.d. setting with a given
key generation rate and a given source distribution. Then, we
derive a lower bound of the exponent of the average of the
L1 norm distance between the generated random number and
the uniform random number when a family of universal2 hash
functions is applied. Next, we introduce a stronger condition
for hash functions, which is called strongly universal2. We
consider the n-independent and identical extension, and show
that the exponential rate of decrease for this bound is tight
under a stronger condition by using the type method, which
was invented by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [19] and is one of
standard methods in information theory. Since our bound
realizes the optimal exponent, it gives a powerful bound even
for the finite length setting [39]. One might consider that
the smooth min entropy can derive the same lower bound
for the exponential decreasing rate of universal composability.
However, as shown in Subsection III-D, the bound derived
by the smooth min entropy is strictly smaller than that by
smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2. This disagreement
is not so unnatural because a similar disagreement appears
for the exponent of error probability in the channel coding
as a relation between Gallager exponent and the lower bound
derived by the information spectrum approach [32].
Further, if our protocol generating the random number is
allowed to depend on the original distribution, there is a
possibility to improve the exponent while it is known that
asymptotic generation cannot be improved [26]. In Section
IV, we derive the optimal exponent in this setting by using
Crame´r’s Theorem [27] and the type method [19]. Based on
comparison between this exponent and the exponent given in
Section III, we can compare the performances between the
protocol taking into account the full probability distribution
of the source and the protocol based on the entropy of the
source, which is realized by universal2 hash functions.
In Section V, we consider the case when an eavesdropper
has a random variable correlated to the random variable of
the authorized user. In this case, applying universal2 hash
functions to his random variable, the authorized user obtain
a secure random variable. We apply our evaluation of L1
norm distance obtained in Subsection III-A (Theorem 1) to
the distribution of the authorized user when the eavesdropper’s
random variable is fixed to a certain value. Then, we obtain
a tighter evaluation (67) than that directly obtained from the
previous paper [6].
In Section VI, we focus on wire-tap channel model, whose
capacity has been calculated by Wyner [12] and Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner [13]. Csisza´r [14] showed the strong security, and many
papers [6], [33], [34] treat this model with mutual information
criterion. The previous paper [17] derived bounds for both
exponential rates of decrease for the security criterion based
on the L1 norm distance as well as the mutual information
between Alice and Eve. It obtained a bound for the exponential
rate of decrease concerning the L1 security criterion. In this
paper, we apply (67) to wire-tap channel model, and obtain
the evaluation of the exponent of the L1 security criterion.
In Section VII, it is shown that the evaluation obtained in
this paper is better than that by the previous paper [17]. In a
realistic setting, it is natural to restrict our codes to linear
codes. In Section VIII, using (75), we provide a security
analysis for a code constructed by the combination of an
arbitrary linear code and privacy amplification by universal2
hash functions. This analysis yields the exponential rate of
decrease for the L1 security criterion. Overall, since (67) and
(75) are derived from Theorem 1, all of the obtained results
concerning the wire-tap channel model can be regarded as
consequences of Theorem 1.
Further, in Section IX, we obtain the bound for the L1 secu-
rity criterion in one-way secret key generation. In Appendix
A, we prove Theorem 2 mentioned in Subsection III-A. In
Appendix B, we prove Lemma 6 given in Subsection IV. In
Appendix C, we show Equation (37), which is important for
comparison in Subsection III-D.
Relation with the previous paper [6]
The main difference from the previous paper [6] is that
the analysis on this paper is based on L1 distinguishability
while that on the previous paper [6] is based on the mutual
information criterion. In the first step, this paper derives an
evaluation (Theorem 1) of the equality of the uniform random
number generation by universal2 hash functions based on the
L1 norm criterion. Applying Theorem 1, we treat several
security problems. Since this paper treats the same security
problems as the previous paper with the different criterion,
some of protocols used in this paper were used in the previous
paper [6]. That is, the coding protocols used in Sections
VI, VIII and IX are used in Sections III, V, and VI in [6],
respectively. While these protocols are described in [6], we
describe the whole protocols in this paper for the readers’
convenience.
For uniform random number generation, this paper gives the
tight exponential rate of decrease for the L1 norm distance,
while the previous paper [6] gives a lower bound on the expo-
nential rate of decrease based on Shannon entropy. Concerning
secret key generation without communication, this paper gives
a lower bound of the exponential rate of decrease based on L1
distinguishability, while the previous paper [6] gives a lower
bound of the exponential rate of decrease based on the mutual
information criterion. Applying Pinsker’s inequality (5), we
can derive a lower bound of the exponential rate of decrease
based on L1 distinguishability from the lower bound in [6].
As is shown in Lemma 8 in Subsection V-B, our lower bound
is (strictly) better than combination of Pinsker’s inequality and
the lower bound by [6] (except for special cases). Note that
application of Pinsker’s inequality (5) or (6) yields the half
of the lower bound of the exponent of the mutual information
as a lower bound of the exponent of universal composability.
Indeed, we give a numerical example in Fig. 3, in which our
bound is strictly better than that by [6].
3Concerning the wire-tap channel in a general framework,
the code given in this paper is quite similar to that in the
previous paper [6]. However, the evaluation method in this
paper is different from that of the previous paper [6] because
the analysis in this paper is based on L1 distinguishability
while that in the previous paper [6] is based on the mutual
information. In this model, we can derive a lower bound for
the exponential rate of decrease based on L1 distinguishability
by the combination of Pinsker’s inequality (5) and the result
in [6]. As is shown in Section VII, our lower bound is better
than this lower bound from [6]. Section VIII treats a more
realistic setting by using linear codes. Even in this setting, as is
explained in Remark 1, our lower bound is strictly better than
the lower bound by [6] (except for special cases mentioned
in Lemma 8). The same observation can be applied to secret
key generation by public communication, which is discussed
in Section IX.
II. PRELIMINARIES
First, we briefly explain some notation and basic knowledge
in information theory. In order to evaluate the difference be-
tween two distributions PX and P˜X , we employ the following
quantities: the L1 distance (variational distance)
d1(P
X , P˜X) :=
∑
x
|PX(x) − P˜X(x)|, (1)
the L2 distance
d2(P
X , P˜X) :=
√∑
x
(PX(x) − P˜X(x))2, (2)
and the KL-divergence
D(PX‖P˜X) :=
∑
x
PX(x)(log PX(x)− log P˜X(x)), (3)
where log expresses the natural logarithm. These definitions
can be extended when the total measure is less than 1 i.e.,∑
a P
A(a) ≤ 1. In the following, we call such PA a sub-
distribution. This extension for sub-distributions is crucial for
the later discussion.
When a joint distribution PX,Y is given, we have the
following equation
d1(P
X,Y , P˜X × PY ) =
∑
x,y
|PX,Y (x, y)− P˜X(x)P Y (y)|
=
∑
y
P Y (y)
∑
x
|PX|Y (x|y) − P˜X(x)|
=
∑
y
P Y (y)d1(P
X|Y=y, P˜X). (4)
When PX , P˜X are normalized distributions, as a relation
between the KL-divergence and the L1 distance, the Pinsker’s
inequality
1
2
d1(P
X , P˜X)2 ≤ D(PX‖P˜X) (5)
is known [19]. That is,
− log d1(PX , P˜X) ≥ −1
2
(logD(PX‖P˜X) + log 2). (6)
These relations will be helpful for later discussions.
III. UNIFORM RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION
A. Protocol based on universal2 hash function: Direct part
Firstly, we consider the uniform random number generation
problem from a biased random number a ∈ A, which obeys
a probability distribution PA for finite cardinality |A|. There
are two types of protocols for this problem. One is a protocol
specialized for the given distribution PA. The other is a uni-
versal protocol that does not depend on the given distribution
PA. The aim of this section is evaluate the performance of
the latter setting. In the latter setting, our protocol is given by
a function f from A to M = {1, . . . ,M}.
The quality of the random number obeying the sub-
distribution PA is evaluated by
d1(P
A) := d1(P
A, PA(A)PAmix), (7)
where PAmix is the uniform distribution on A. We also use the
Re´nyi entropy of order 1 + s:
H1+s(A|PA) := −1
s
log
∑
a
PA(a)1+s.
The L2 distance is written by using the Re´nyi entropy of order
2 as follows.
d2(P
A, PA(A)PAmix)2 = e−H2(A|P
A) − P
A(A)2
|A| . (8)
Now, we focus on an ensemble of functions fX from A
to M = {1, . . . ,M}, where X denotes a random variable
describing the stochastic behavior of the function fX. In this
case, we adopt on the following quantity as a criterion of the
secrecy:
EXd1(P
fX(A)) = EXd1(P
fX(A), PA(A)P fX(A)mix )
=d1(P
B,X, PA(A)PBmix × PX), (9)
where B is the random variable fX(A) and the final equation
follows from (4). Hence, when the expectation EXd1(P fX(A))
is sufficiently small, the random variable fX(A) is almost
independent of the side information X. Then, the choice
fX can be communicated between Alice and Bob without
revealing anything about f(A).
An ensemble of hash functions fX is called universal2 when
it satisfies the following condition [1]:
Condition 1 (Universal2): For any elements a1 6= a2 ∈ A,
the collision probability that fX(a1) = fX(a2) is at most 1M .
We sometimes require the following additional condition:
Condition 2: For any X, the cardinality of f−1
X
{i} does not
depend on i.
This condition will be used in Section IV.
Indeed, when the cardinality |A| is a power of a prime
power q and M is another power of the same prime power
q, as is shown in Appendix II of the previous paper [6],
the ensemble {fX} can be chosen to be the concatenation
of a Toeplitz matrix and the identity (X, I) [18] only with
logq |A| − 1 random variables taking values in the finite field
Fq. That is, the function can be obtained by the multiplication
of the random matrix (X, I) taking values in Fq. In this case,
Condition 2 can be confirmed because the rank of (X, I) is
constant.
4Bennett et al [2] essentially showed the following lemma.
Lemma 1: A family of universal2 hash functions fX satis-
fies
EXe
−H2(fX(A)|P
fX(A)) ≤ e−H2(A|PA) + P
A(A)2
M
. (10)
This was also shown by Ha˚stad et al [30] and is often called
leftover hash lemma.
Now, we follow the derivation of Theorem 5.5.1 of Renner
[5] when one classical random variable is given. The Schwarz
inequality implies that
d1(P
fX(A), PA(A)P fX(A)mix )
≤
√
M
√
d2(P fX(A), PA(A)P fX(A)mix ).
Jensen’s inequality yields that
EXd1(P
fX(A), PA(A)P fX(A)mix )
≤
√
M
√
EXd2(P fX(A), PA(A)P fX(A)mix ).
Substituting (8) and (10) into the above inequality, we obtain
EXd1(P
fX(A)) ≤M 12 e−H2(A|P
A)
2 . (11)
Using (11), we can show the following theorem as a
generalization of (11).
Theorem 1: A family of universal2 hash functions fX sat-
isfies
EXd1(P
fX(A)) ≤ 3M s1+s e−
sH1+s(A|P
A)
1+s for 0 ≤ s ≤ 1.
(12)
Substituting s = 1, we obtain
EXd1(P
fX(A)) ≤ 3M 12 e−H2(A|P
A)
2 . (13)
Since the difference between (11) and (13) is only the coeffi-
cient, Theorem 1 can be regarded as a kind of generalization
of Bennett et al [2]’s result (10).
Proof: For any R′ > 0, we choose the subset ΩR′ :=
{PA(a) > e−R′}, and define the sub-distribution PAR′ by
PAR′ (a) :=
{
0 if a ∈ ΩR′
PA(a) otherwise.
Since
d1(P
A, PAR′) = P
A(ΩR′)
and
d1(P
A
R′(A)P fX(A)mix , PA(A)P fX(A)mix )
=d1(0, (P
A(A)− PAR′(A))P fX(A)mix )
=(PA(A)− PAR′(A))d1(0, P fX(A)mix )
=PA(A) − PAR′(A) = PA(ΩR′ ),
the idea of “smoothing” by Renner [5] yields that
d1(P
fX(A)) = d1(P
fX(A), PA(A)P fX(A)mix )
≤d1(P fX(A), P fX(A)R′ ) + d1(P fX(A)R′ , PAR′(A)P fX(A)mix )
+ d1(P
A
R′(A)P fX(A)mix , PA(A)P fX(A)mix )
=2PA(ΩR′ ) + d1(P
fX(A)
R′ ). (14)
Taking the expectation over X, we obtain
EXd1(P
fX(A)) ≤ 2PA(ΩR′) + EXd1(P fX(A)R′ ). (15)
The inequality (11) yields
EXd1(P
fX(A)
R′ ) ≤M
1
2 e−
1
2H2(A|P
A
R′
).
For 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, we can evaluate e−H2(A|PAR′) and PA(ΩR′) as
e−H2(A|P
A
R′
) =
∑
a∈Ωc
R′
PA(a)2 ≤
∑
a∈Ωc
R′
PA(a)1+se−(1−s)R
′
≤
∑
a
PA(a)1+se−(1−s)R
′
= e−sH1+s(A|P
A)−(1−s)R′ (16)
PA(ΩR′) =
∑
a∈ΩR′
PA(a) ≤
∑
a∈ΩR′
(PA(a))1+sesR
′
≤
∑
a
(PA(a))1+sesR
′
= e−sH1+s(A|P
A)+sR′ . (17)
Combining (15), (16), and (17), for R := logM , we obtain
EXd1(P
fX(A))
≤2e−sH1+s(A|PA)+sR′ + eR+ 12 (−sH1+s(A|PA)−(1−s)R′)
=3e−
sH1+s(A|P
A)+sR
1+s ,
where we substitute R+sH1+s(A|P
A)
1+s into R
′
.
Next, we consider the case when our distribution PAn is
given by the n-fold independent and identical distribution of
PA, i.e, (PA)n. When the random number generation rate
limn→∞
1
n logMn is R, we focus on the exponential rate of
decrease of EXd1(P fX,n(An)), and consider the supremum.
When an ensemble {fX,n} of hash functions is a family of
universal2 hash functions from An to {1, . . .Mn}, Theorem
1 yields that
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EXd1(P
fX,n(An))
≥sH1+s(A|P
A)− sR
1 + s
for s ∈ [0, 1]. Taking the maximum over s ∈ [0, 1], we obtain
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EXd1(P
fX,n(An))
≥ max
0≤s≤1
sH1+s(A|PA)− sR
1 + s
. (18)
On the other hand, when we apply the Pinsker’s inequality
[19] to the upper bound for the mutual information ob-
tained by the previous paper [6], we obtain another bound
max0≤s≤1
sH1+s(A|P
A)−sR
2 , which is smaller than (18).
B. Protocol based on universal2 hash functions: Converse
part
In order to show the tightness of the exponential rate of
decrease (18) under the universal2 condition, we consider the
following property.
Condition 3 (Strongly universal2): For any a ∈ A,
Pr{fX(a) = m} = 1M . The random variable fX(a) is
independent of {fX(a′)}a′ 6=a∈A.
5Theorem 2: For any strongly universal2 ensemble, any sub-
set Ω ⊂ A with |Ω| < M satisfies
EXd1(P
fX(A)) ≥ (1− |Ω|
M
)2PA(Ω). (19)
The proof is given in Appendix A.
In order to derive the inequality opposite to (18) from
Theorem 2, we employ the type method [19]. In the type
method, when an n-trial data ~an := (a1, . . . , an) ∈ An is
given, we focus on the distribution p(a) := #{i|ai=a}n , which
is called the empirical distribution for the data ~an. In the
type method, an empirical distribution is called a type. In
the following, we denote the set of empirical distributions
on A with n trials by Tn. The cardinality |Tn| is bounded
by (n+ 1)|A|−1 [19], which increases polynomially with the
number n. That is,
lim
n→∞
1
n
log |Tn| = 0. (20)
This property is the key idea in the type method. When Tn(Q)
represents the set of n-trial data whose empirical distribution
is Q, the cardinality of Tn(Q) can be evaluated as [19]:
⌈e
nH(Q)
|Tn| ⌉ ≤ |Tn(Q)| ≤ ⌊e
nH(Q)⌋, (21)
where ⌈x⌉ is the minimum integer m satisfying m ≥ x, and
⌊x⌋ is the maximum m satisfying m ≤ x. Since any element
~a ∈ Tn(Q) satisfies
PAn(~a) = e−n(D(Q‖P
A)+H(Q)), (22)
we obtain an important formula
1
Tn e
−nD(Q‖PA) ≤ PAn(Tn(Q)) ≤ e−nD(Q‖PA). (23)
Using the above knowledge, we can show the following
proposition:
Proposition 1: When Mn = ⌊enR⌋, any sequence of
strongly universal2 ensembles {fX,n} from An to {1, . . .Mn}
satisfies the equation
lim sup
n→∞
−1
n
log EXd1(P
fX,n(An)) ≤ min
Q:H(Q)≤R
D(Q‖PA),
(24)
where D(Q‖PA) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence∑
a∈AQ(a)(logQ(a)− logPA(a)).
Proof: Choose an arbitrary empirical distribution Q ∈ Tn
satisfying that H(Q) ≤ R. Then, due to (21), the cardinality
|Tn(Q)| is less than ⌊enR⌋. We choose the subset Ωn,Q with
the cardinality ⌈ 12enR⌉ so that it contains at least ⌈ |Tn(Q)|2 ⌉
elements of Tn(Q). Using (21) and (22), we obtain
PAn(Ωn,Q) ≥|Tn(Q)|
2
e−n(D(Q‖P
A)+H(Q))
≥e
nH(Q)
2|Tn| e
−n(D(Q‖PA)+H(Q)).
Using Theorem 2 with Ωn,Q, we obtain
EXd1(P
fX,n(An)) ≥ (1− ⌈
1
2e
nR⌉
⌊enR⌋ )
2 1
2|Tn|e
−nD(Q‖PA).
Since Q is an arbitrary empirical distribution Q ∈ Tn satisfy-
ing that H(Q) ≤ R,
EXd1(P
fX,n(An))
≥(1− ⌈
1
2e
nR⌉
⌊enR⌋ )
2 1
2|Tn| maxQ∈Tn:H(Q)≤R e
−nD(Q‖PA).
That is,
−1
n
log EXd1(P
fX,n(An))
≤ min
Q∈Tn:H(Q)≤R
D(Q‖PA) + 1
n
log 2|Tn|
− 2
n
log(1− ⌈
1
2e
nR⌉
⌊enR⌋ ).
Due to the continuity of Q 7→ H(Q), D(Q‖PA) and (20), the
limit n→∞ yields (24).
When R ≤ H(A|PA), the equation
max
0≤s
s(H1+s(A|PA)−R)
1 + s
= min
Q:H(Q)≤R
D(Q‖PA) (25)
is known as the strong converse exponent in fixed
source coding [19], [31],[24, (A21)]. The maximum
max0≤s
s(H1+s(A|P
A)−R)
1+s is realized at s = s0 when R =
Rs0 := (1 + s0)
d
ds (sH1+s(A|PA))|s=s0 − s0H1+s0(A|PA).
Since ddsRs = (1 + s)
d2
ds2 (sH1+s(A|PA)) ≤ 0, Rs is
monotone decreasing with s.
Thus, when H(A|PA) ≥ R ≥ R1 (R1 is called the critical
rate.),
max
0≤s
s(H1+s(A|PA)−R)
1 + s
= max
0≤s≤1
s(H1+s(A|PA)−R)
1 + s
.
(26)
Hence, in this case, due to (18), (24), (25), and (26), we obtain
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log EXd1(P
fX,n(An))
= max
0≤s≤1
s(H1+s(A|PA)−R)
1 + s
= min
Q:H(Q)≤R
D(Q‖PA).
(27)
However, when R < R1,
max
0≤s≤1
s(H1+s(A|PA)−R)
1 + s
=
H2(A|PA)−R
2
<max
0≤s
s(H1+s(A|PA)−R)
1 + s
.
So, the lower bound in (18) does not coincide with the upper
bound in (24).
C. Comparison with evaluation by Holenstein-Renner [29]
In the above derivation, the key point is evaluating the prob-
ability PA(ΩR′), which equals the probability (PA)n{a ∈
An|(PA)n(a) > e−nR′} in the n-i.i.d. setting. In the com-
munity of cryptography, the n-i.i.d. setting is not regarded
as an important setting because they are more interested in
the single-shot setting. In such a setting, they sometimes
use Holenstein-Renner’s [29] evaluation of PX(ΩR′). They
proved the following theorem.
6Theorem 3: When 0 ≤ H(A)−R′ ≤ log |A|,
(PA)n{a ∈ An|(PA)n(a) > e−nR′} ≤ 2−
n(H(A)−R′)2
2(log(|A|+3))2 .
(28)
Further, when |A| ≥ 3 and 0 ≤ H(A)−R′ ≤ log(|A|−1)12 ,
(PA)n{a ∈ An|(PA)n(a) > e−nR′} > 1
110
2
− 12n(H(A)−R
′)2
(log(|A|−1))2 .
When |A| = 2, the inequality yields the following evaluation.
When 0 ≤ H(A)−R′ ≤ log 324 ,
(PA)n{a ∈ An|(PA)n(a) > e−nR′} > 1
110
2
− 24n(H(A)−R
′)2
(log 3)2
for even n.
Our evaluation (17) of (PA)n{a ∈ An|(PA)n(a) > e−nR′}
contains the parameter 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. Since this parame-
ter is arbitrary, it is natural to compare the upper bound
min0≤s≤1 e
−n(sH1+s(X|P
X)−sR′) given by (17) with that by
Theorem 3. That is, using (17), we obtain the exponential
evaluation
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log(PA)n{a ∈ An|(PA)n(a) > e−nR′}
≥max
0≤s
sH1+s(A|PA)− sR′,
while Theorem 3 yields that
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log(PA)n{a ∈ An|(PA)n(a) > e−nR′}
≥ (H(A)−R
′)2
2(log(|A|+ 3))2 log 2.
In this case, the upper bound is 12 log 2(H(A)−R
′)2
(log(|A|−1))2 for |A| ≥ 3
and 24 log 2(H(A)−R
′)2
(log 3)2 for |A| = 2.
In fact, the probability PA(ΩR′) is the key quantity in the
method of information spectrum, which is a unified method
in information theory [32]. When the method of informa-
tion spectrum is applied to an i.i.d. source, the probability
PA(ΩR′) is evaluated by applying Crame´r’s Theorem (see
[27]) to the random variable logPA(a). Then we obtain
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log(PA)n{a ∈ An|(PA)n(a) > e−nR′}
=max
0≤s
sH1+s(A|PA)− sR′ (29)
for R ≤ H(A). Since s 7→ sH1+s(X |PX) is concave, when
H(A) ≥ R ≥ H ′2(A|PA), the maximization (29) can be
attained with s ∈ [0, 1], i.e.,
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log(PA)n{a ∈ An|(PA)n(a) > e−nR′}
= max
0≤s≤1
sH1+s(A|PA)− sR′.
which implies that our evaluation (17) gives the tight bound
for exponential rate of decrease for the probability (PA)n{a ∈
An|(PA)n(a) > e−nR′}. In fact, the difference among these
bounds is numerically given in Fig. 1. Therefore, we can
conclude that our evaluation (17) is much better than that by
Holenstein-Renner [29]. That is, the combination of Lemma 1
and (17) is essential for deriving the tight exponential bound.
0.305 0.455 0.5 R¢0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
Exponent
Fig. 1. Evaluation of limn→∞ −1n log(P
A)n{a ∈ An|(PA)n(a) >
e−nR
′
}. Thick line: max0≤s≤1 sH1+s(A|PA)− sR′ (The present paper),
Normal line: (H(A)−R
′)2
2(log(|A|+3))2
log 2 (Lower bound by [29]), Dashed line:
24 log 2(H(A)−R′)2
(log 3)2
(Upper bound by [29]). Here, PA is chosen to be the
binary distribution PA(0) = α, PA(1) = 1 − α with α = 0.200. Then,
h(α) = H(A) = 0.500,
d(sH1+s(A))
ds
|s=1 = 0.305, and H(A) − log 324 =
0.455.
D. Comparison with smooth min-entropy
In subsection III-A, we treated smoothing of Re´nyi entropy
of order 2. In this subsection, we compare this method
with smooth min-entropy, which is more familiar in the
community of cryptography [5]. When we employ the min-
entropy Hmin(A|PA) := − logmaxa∈A PA(a) instead of
Re´nyi entropy of order 2 in (11), we obtain the following
inequality:
EXd1(P
fX(A)) ≤M 12 e−Hmin(A|P
A)
2 . (30)
Now, we choose another distribution P˜A satisfying
d1(P˜
A, PA) ≤ ǫ. Using (9), (30), and ǫ-smooth min-
entropy Hmin,ǫ(A|PA) := maxP :d1(P˜A,PA)≤ǫHmin(A|P˜A),
we can show the following inequality [5]
EXd1(P
fX(A)) = EXd1(P
fX(A), PA(A)P fX(A)mix )
≤EXd1(P˜ fX(A), P˜A(A)P fX(A)mix ) + d1(P˜ fX(A), P fX(A))
+ d1(P˜
A(A)P fX(A)mix , PA(A)P fX(A)mix )
≤M 12 e−Hmin(A|P˜
A)
2 + d1(P˜
A(A), PA(A))
+ |P˜A(A)P fX(A)mix , PA(A)|
≤M 12 e−
Hmin,ǫ(A|P
A)
2 + 2ǫ. (31)
Next, using the subdistribution PAR′ defined in proof of The-
orem 1, we choose ǫ to be d1(PA, PAR′) = PA(ΩR′) for a
given R′ ≥ logM . Then,
EXd1(P
fX(A)) ≤M 12 e−
Hmin,ǫ(A|P
A)
2 + 2ǫ
≤M 12 e−
Hmin(A|P
A
R′
)
2 + 2ǫ
≤
√
M
eR′
+ 2PA{a ∈ A|PA(a) > e−R′}. (32)
Applying the inequality (17), we obtain
EXd1(P
fX(A)) ≤M 12 e−R′/2 + 2e−sH1+s(A|PA)+sR′
7for s ≥ 0. When R = logM ,
EXd1(P
fX(A)) ≤ e(R−R′)/2 + 2e−(sH1+s(A|PA)−sR′). (33)
Now, we choose R′ = R′0 such that (R′0 − R)/2 =
sH1+s(A|PA)− sR′0, which implies R′0 = R+2sH1+s(A|P
A)
1+2s .
Hence, (R′0 −R)/2 = sH1+s(A|P
A)−sR
1+2s . Thus, we obtain
EXd1(P
fX(A)) ≤ 3e−
sH1+s(A|P
A)−sR
1+2s . (34)
Taking the minimum over s > 0, we have
EXd1(P
fX(A)) ≤ 3e−maxs≥0
sH1+s(A|P
A)−sR
1+2s . (35)
Next, we consider the case when our distribution PAn is
given by the n-fold independent and identical distribution of
PA, i.e, (PA)n. Similar to (18), (35) yields
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EXd1(P
fX,n(An))
≥max
0≤s
sH1+s(A|PA)− sR
1 + 2s
= max
0≤t≤1
tH1/(1−t)(A|PA)− tR
1 + t
, (36)
where t = s1+s . In fact, as shown in Appendix C, the
exponential decreasing rate of the right hand side of (31) is
calculated as
lim
n→∞
−1
n
logmin
ǫ
(e
nR
2 e−
Hmin,ǫ(A
n|(PA)n)
2 + 2ǫ)
= max
0≤t≤1
tH1/(1−t)(A|PA)− tR
1 + t
. (37)
Hence, we can consider that max0≤t≤1
tH1/(1−t)(A|P
A)−tR
1+t
expresses the optimal exponential decreasing rate for the
method of smooth min-entropy. For 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, the relation t ≤
t
1−t implies the inequality H1/(1−t)(A|PA) ≤ H1+t(A|PA).
Hence, the bound max0≤s sH1+s(A|P
A)−sR
1+2s is smaller than the
presented bound max0≤s≤1 sH1+s(A|P
A)−sR
1+s , whose numeri-
cal comparison is illustrated in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. Comparison between max0≤s
sH1+s(A|P
A)−sR
1+s
and
max0≤s
sH1+s(A|P
A)−sR
1+2s
. Thick line: max0≤s
sH1+s(A|P
A)−sR
1+s(Smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2. The present paper), Normal line:
max0≤s
sH1+s(A|P
A)−sR
1+2s
. (Smoothing of min entropy. [5]). Here, PA
is chosen to be the binary distribution PA(0) = α, PA(1) = 1 − α with
α = 0.200. Then, h(α) = H(A) = 0.500.
IV. SPECIALIZED PROTOCOL FOR UNIFORM RANDOM
NUMBER GENERATION
A. Main result of this section
Next, we consider a function f from A to {1, . . . ,M} spe-
cialized to a given probability distribution PA. This problem is
called intrinsic randomness, which was studied with general
source by Vembu and Verdu´ [26]. The previous paper [25]
discussed the relation between the second order asymptotic
rate and the central limit theorem. In the following, for the
comparison with the exponential rate of decrease for (25),
we prove the following theorem, which gives the optimal
exponential rate of decrease for a given rate of uniform random
number generation.
Theorem 4: When d(sH1+s(A|P ))ds |s=1 ≤ R, we obtain
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log min
fn∈Fn(R)
d1(P
fn(An))
= max
0≤s≤1
s(H1+s(A|PA)−R), (38)
where Fn(R) is the set of functions fn from An to
{1, . . . , ⌊enR⌋}.
Combining (27) and Theorem 4, we can compare the
performances between a random universal protocol and the
best specialized protocol. So, our exponential rate of decrease
for the protocol based on universal2 hash functions is slightly
smaller than the optimal exponential rate of decrease for
specialized protocols.
In order to prove Theorem 4, we will show the following
two inequalities:
lim sup
n→∞
−1
n
log min
fn∈Fn(R)
d1(P
fn(An))
≤ max
0≤s≤1
s(H1+s(A|PA)−R) (39)
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log min
fn∈Fn(R)
d1(P
fn(An))
≥ max
0≤s≤1
s(H1+s(A|PA)−R). (40)
Inequality (39) is called the converse part and Inequality (40) is
called the direct part in the information theory community. In
order to show the respective inequalities, we prepare respective
lemmas (Lemmas 2 and 4) in the non-asymptotic setting in
Subsection IV-B. In Subsection IV-C, using Lemma 4 and
the concavity property, we show the converse part (39). Also,
using Lemma 2, we show the direct part (39). In the latter
derivation, we employ again the method of types [19].
B. Non-asymptotic evaluation
In order to treat the non-asymptotic case, we introduce the
notation:
[x]+ :=
{
x if x ≥ 0
0 if x < 0.
Then, the L1 norm for two normalized distributions P and Q
can be simplified to∑
a
|P (a)−Q(a)| = 2
∑
a
[P (a)−Q(a)]+, (41)
8which is a useful formula for the following discussion.
Hence, we obtain the following lemma, which is useful for
our proof of the direct part (40).
Lemma 2: Any probability distribution PA and any func-
tion f from A to {1, . . . ,M} satisfy that
d1(P
f(A)) ≥ PA{a ∈ A|PA(a) ≥ 2
M
}. (42)
Proof:
Any positive numbers α1, . . . , αk satisfies
[
k∑
i=1
αi − 1
M
]+ ≥
k∑
i=1
[αi − 1
M
]+. (43)
When PA(a) ≥ 2M , PA(a)− 1M ≥ 1M , which implies that
2[PA(a)− 1
M
]+ = 2(P
A(a)− 1
M
)
≥PA(a)− 1
M
+
1
M
= PA(a). (44)
Thus, we obtain
∑
b
|PA(f−1(b))− 1
M
| = 2
∑
b
[PA(f−1(b))− 1
M
]+
≥2
∑
a∈A
[PA(a)− 1
M
]+ (45)
≥2
∑
a∈A:PA(a)≥ 2M
[PA(a)− 1
M
]+
≥
∑
a∈A:PA(a)≥ 2M
PA(a), (46)
where (45) and (46) follows from (43) and (44). Therefore,
we obtain (42).
In order to show the converse part, we prepare the following
lemma.
Lemma 3: Assume that for two integers M ≥ N , two
positive number sequences α1, . . . , αN and β1, . . . , βM satisfy
that
∑N
i=1 αi ≥
∑M
i=1 βi. Then, there exists a map f from
{1, . . . ,M} to {1, . . . , N} such that
N∑
i=1
[
∑
j∈f−1(i)
βj − αi]+ ≤ N max
j
βj . (47)
Proof: First, we define f(1) := 1. For j > 1, we define
f(j) inductively. When
∑
j′∈f−1(f(j−1)) βj′ < αf(j−1), we
define f(j) := f(j − 1). Otherwise, we define f(j) := f(j −
1) + 1. Then the function satisfies the condition (47).
Now we consider the case when our distribution PAn is
given by the n-fold independent and identical distribution
of PA, i.e, (PA)n. Using Lemma 3, we have the following
lemma, which is useful for our proof of the converse part (39).
Lemma 4: For any probability distribution PA, there exists
a function fn from An to {1, . . . ,Mn} such that
d1(P
fn(An))
≤2(PA)n{a ∈ An|(PA)n(a) ≥ 1
Mn
}
+ 2
∑
Q∈T 1n [Mn]
Mne
−n(D(Q‖PA)+H(Q)) · (PA)n(Tn(Q))
+ 2|Tn| max
Q∈T 2n [Mn]
e−n(D(Q‖P
A)+H(Q)) (48)
where
T 1n [Mn] := {Q ∈ Tn|D(Q‖PA) +H(Q) ≥
1
n
logMn}
T 2n [Mn] := {Q ∈ Tn|(PA)n(Tn(Q)) <
1
Mn
}.
Proof: In the first step, we define the function fn. In the
second step, we show that the function satisfies (48).
We divide Tn into three parts:
T˜ 0n [Mn] := {Q ∈ Tn|en(D(Q‖P
A)+H(Q)) ≤Mn}
T˜ 1n [Mn] := {Q ∈ (T˜ 0n [Mn])c ∩ Tn|(PA)n(Tn(Q)) ≥
1
Mn
}
T˜ 2n [Mn] := {Q ∈ (T˜ 0n [Mn])c ∩ Tn|(PA)n(Tn(Q)) <
1
Mn
},
where (T˜ 0n [Mn])c is the complement of T˜ 0n [Mn]. These three
parts have the following relation with the above two parts:
T˜ 1n [Mn] ⊂ T 1n [Mn], T˜ 2n [Mn] ⊂ T 2n [Mn].
By using the integer nQ := ⌊ (P
A)n(Tn(Q))
1/Mn
⌋ =
⌊Mn(PA)n(Tn(Q))⌋, the conditions for T˜ 1n [Mn] and T˜ 2n [Mn]
are written as nQ ≥ 1 and nQ < 1, respectively. Note that,
since nQ is a non-negative integer, nQ < 1 is equivalent to
nQ = 0.
Due to (22), the condition that en(D(Q‖PA)+H(Q)) ≤ Mn
is equivalent with the condition that PAn(a) ≥ 1Mn for a ∈
Tn(Q). Hence,
(PA)n{a ∈ An|(PA)n(a) ≥ 1
Mn
} =
∑
Q∈T 0n
(PA)n(Tn(Q)).
(49)
So,
(PA)n{a ∈ An|(PA)n(a) ≥ 1
Mn
}+
∑
Q∈T˜ 1n [Mn]
nQ
Mn
≤
∑
Q∈T˜ 0n [Mn]
(PA)n(Tn(Q)) +
∑
Q∈T˜ 1n [Mn]
(PA)n(Tn(Q)) ≤ 1.
Since
1
Mn
∑
Q∈T˜ 0n [Mn]
|Tn(Q)| = 1
Mn
|{a ∈ An|(PA)n(a) ≥ 1
Mn
}|
≤(PA)n{a ∈ An|(PA)n(a) ≥ 1
Mn
},
we have ∑
Q∈T˜ 0n [Mn]
|Tn(Q)|+
∑
Q∈T˜ 1n [Mn]
nQ ≤Mn.
9Therefore, we can choose f ′n on Ω′ :=
∪Q∈T˜ 0n [Mn]∪T˜ 1n [Mn]Tn(Q) satisfying the following conditions.
1) For Q,Q′ ∈ T˜ 0n [Mn] ∪ T˜ 1n [Mn], f ′n(Tn(Q)) ∩
f ′n(T (Q
′)) = ∅.
2) f ′n|Tn(Q) is injective for Q ∈ T˜ 0n [Mn].
3) |f ′n(Tn(Q))| = nQ for Q ∈ T˜ 1n [Mn].
4) Any type Q ∈ T˜ 1n [Mn] satisfies that |f ′n−1(b)| ≤ |Tn(Q)|nQ
for b ∈ f ′n(Tn(Q)).
Then, for Q ∈ T˜ 1n [Mn], we obtain
P f
′
n(An)(b) ≤ 1
Mn
+ e−n(D(Q‖P
A)+H(Q)), ∀b ∈ f ′n(Tn(Q)).
(50)
From the construction,∑
b∈f ′n(Ω
′)
P f
′
n(An)(b) ≥ 1
Mn
|f ′n(Ω′)|.
That is, ∑
a∈(Ω′)c
PAn(a) ≤ 1
Mn
|(f ′n(Ω′))c|. (51)
Next, we define fn on the whole set by modifying f ′n as
follows.
5) fn is the same as f ′n on Ω′.
6) Due to (51), we can apply Lemma 3 to the case when
{1, . . . , N} = (f ′n(Ω′))c, {1, . . . ,M} = (Ω′)c, αb =
1
Mn
for b ∈ (f ′n(Ω′))c and βa = PAn(a) for a ∈ (Ω′)c.
Following Lemma 3, we define the map fn|(Ω′)c from
(Ω′)c to (f ′n(Ω
′))c.
Our remaining task is to evaluate the value∑
b[P
fn(An)(b)− 1Mn ]+. Now, we define
C(Q) :=
∑
b∈fn(Tn(Q))
[P fn(An)(b)− 1
Mn
]+.
Then, (49) implies that
∑
Q∈T˜ 0n [Mn]
C(Q) ≤ (PA)n{a ∈ An|(PA)n(a) ≥ 1
Mn
}. (52)
For Q ∈ T˜ 1n [Mn], (50) implies
C(Q) ≤nQe−nD(Q‖PA)−nH(Q)
≤Mne−nD(Q‖P
A)−nH(Q) · (PA)n(Tn(Q)). (53)
Thus, (52) and (53) imply
∑
b∈f ′n(Ω
′)
[P fn(An)(b)− 1
Mn
]+
≤(PA)n{a ∈ An|(PA)n(a) ≥ 1
Mn
}
+
∑
Q∈T 1n [Mn]
Mne
−nD(Q‖PA)−nH(Q) · (PA)n(Tn(Q)).
(54)
Recall the condition 6). Lemma 3 guarantees that
∑
b∈(f ′n(Ω
′))c
[P fn(An)(b)− 1
Mn
]+
≤|(f ′n(Ω′))c| max
Q∈T˜ 2n [Mn]
e−n(D(Q‖P
A)+H(Q))
≤|Tn| max
Q∈T 2n [Mn]
e−n(D(Q‖P
A)+H(Q)). (55)
Combining (54) and (55), we obtain (48).
C. Asymptotic evaluation
Next, we proceed to the asymptotic evaluation. First, using
Crame´r’s Theorem [27], we obtain
max
0≤s
sH1+s(A|PA)− sR
= lim
n→∞
−1
n
log(PA)n{a ∈ An|(PA)n(a) ≥ 1
enR
} (56)
Hence, Equality (56) and Lemma 2 imply
lim sup
n→∞
−1
n
log min
fn∈Fn(R)
d1(P
fn(An))
≤max
0≤s
s(H1+s(A|PA)−R). (57)
Since s 7→ sH1+s(A|PA) is concave,
when d(sH1+s(A|P ))ds |s=1 ≤ R, the maximum
max0≤s s(H1+s(A|PA) − R) is realized at s ∈ [0, 1], i.e.,
max0≤s≤1 s(H1+s(A|PA)−R) = max0≤s s(H1+s(A|PA)−
R). Therefore, we obtain the converse part (39).
In order to show the direct part (40), we will show the
following lemma by employing Lemma 2.
Lemma 5:
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log min
fn∈Fn(R)
d1(P
fn(An))
≥ max
0≤s≤1
s(H1+s(A|PA)−R). (58)
In order to show Lemma 5, we prepare the following lemma,
whose proof is given in Appendix B.
Lemma 6: When d(sH1+s(A|P ))ds |s=1 ≤ R,
min
Q:H(Q)+D(Q‖P )≥R
H(Q) + 2D(Q‖P )−R
=max
0≤s
sH1+s(A|P )− sR
= max
0≤s≤1
sH1+s(A|P )− sR. (59)
When d(sH1+s(A|P ))ds |s=1 > R,
min
Q:H(Q)+D(Q‖P )≥R
H(Q) + 2D(Q‖P )−R
=H2(A|P ) −R (60)
= max
0≤s≤1
sH1+s(A|P )− sR. (61)
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Proof of Lemma 5: Due to (20), (21), and the continuity
of Q 7→ H(Q) and D(Q‖PA), we obtain
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log 2|Tn| max
Q∈T 2n [⌊e
nR⌋]
e−n(D(Q‖P
A)+H(Q))
= lim
n→∞
min
Q∈T 2n [⌊e
nR⌋]
D(Q‖PA) +H(Q)
= min
Q:D(Q‖PA)≥R
D(Q‖PA) +H(Q)
≥ min
Q:D(Q‖PA)≥R
H(Q) + 2D(Q‖PA)−R
≥ min
Q:H(Q)+D(Q‖PA)≥R
H(Q) + 2D(Q‖PA)−R. (62)
From (23),
Kn :=
∑
Q∈T 1n [⌊e
nR⌋]
⌊enR⌋(PA)n(Tn(Q))e−n(D(Q‖PA)+H(Q))
satisfies that
max
Q∈T 1n [⌊e
nR⌋]
1
Tn e
−n(2D(Q‖PA)+H(Q)−R)
≤Kn ≤ Tn max
Q∈T 1n [⌊e
nR⌋]
e−n(2D(Q‖P
A)+H(Q)−R).
Due to (20) and the continuity of Q 7→ H(Q) and D(Q‖PA),
lim
n→∞
−1
n
logKn
= min
Q:H(Q)+D(Q‖PA)≥R
H(Q) + 2D(Q‖PA)−R. (63)
As is shown in Lemma 6, RHSs of (62) and
(63) equal max0≤s≤1 sH1+s(A|PA) − sR. Since
max0≤s sH1+s(A|PA) − sR ≥ max0≤s≤1 sH1+s(A|PA) −
sR, (56) implies that
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log(PA)n{a ∈ An|(PA)n(a) ≥ 2
enR
}
≥ max
0≤s≤1
s(H1+s(A|PA)−R). (64)
Thus, applying (62), (63), and (64) to the RHS of (48), and
using Lemma 6, we can choose a sequence {fn} such that
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
logmin
fn
d1(P
fn(An))
≥ max
0≤s≤1
s(H1+s(A|PA)−R), (65)
which implies (58).
V. SECRET KEY GENERATION WITHOUT COMMUNICATION
A. Application of Theorem 1
Next, we consider the secure key generation problem from
a common random number A ∈ A which has been partially
eavesdropped on by Eve. For this problem, it is assumed that
Alice and Bob share a common random number A ∈ A, and
Eve has another random number E ∈ E , which is correlated
to the random number A. The task is to extract a common
random number f(A) from the random number A ∈ A, which
is almost independent of Eve’s random number E ∈ E . Here,
Alice and Bob are only allowed to apply the same function f
to the common random number A ∈ A.
Then, when the initial random variables A and E obey the
distribution PA,E , Eve’s distinguishability can be represented
by the following value:
d1(P
f(A),E |E) := d1(P f(A),E, P f(A)mix × PE),
where P f(A)mix ×PE is the product distribution of both marginal
distributions P f(A)mix and PE , and P
f(A)
mix is the uniform distribu-
tion on {1, . . . ,M}. While the half of this value directly gives
the probability that Eve can distinguish Alice’s information,
we call d1(P f(A),E|E) Eve’s distinguishability in the follow-
ing. This criterion was proposed by [22] and was used by [5].
Since the half of this quantity d1(P f(A),E |E) is closely related
to universally composable security, we adopt it as the secrecy
criterion in this paper. As another criterion, we sometimes treat
d′1(P
f(A),E |E) := d1(P f(A),E, P f(A) × PE).
Since d1(P f(A) × PE , PMmix × PE) = d1(P f(A), PMmix) ≤
d1(P
f(A),E , PMmix × PE), we have
d′1(P
f(A),E |E) ≤ 2d1(P f(A),E |E).
Further, when P f(A) is the uniform distribution, the above
criteria coincide with each other.
Next, we consider an ensemble of universal2 hash functions
{fX}. Similar to (9), the equation
EXd1(P
fX(A),E |E) = d1(PB,E,X, PBmix × PE × PX) (66)
holds, where B is the random variable fX(A). Hence, when
the expectation EXd1(P fX(A),E |E) is sufficiently small, the
random variable fX(A) is almost independent of the random
variables X and E. So, the above value is suitable even when
we randomly choose a hash function.
In order to evaluate the average performance, we define the
quantity
φ(t|A|E|PA,E) := log
∑
e
PE(e)(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e) 11−t )1−t
= log
∑
e
(
∑
a
PA,E(a, e)
1
1−t )1−t.
Note that when Eve’s random variable E takes a continu-
ous value in the set E , the relation (67) holds by defining
φ(t|A|E|PA,E) in the following way.
φ(t|A|E|PA,E) := log
∫
E
PE(e)de(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e) 11−t )1−t.
This definition does not depend on the choice of the measure
on E .
By using Theorem 1 and putting t = s1+s , any universal2
hash functions {fX} satisfies the inequality:
EXd1(P
fX(A),E|E) ≤ 3M s1+sEe(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s) 11+s
= 3M teφ(t|A|E|P
A,E) (67)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ 12 . Therefore, there exists a function f such that
d1(P
f(A),E |E) ≤ 3M s1+sEe(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s) 11+s
= 3M teφ(t|P
A,E). (68)
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Next, we consider the case when our distribution PAnEn
is given by the n-fold independent and identical distribution
of PAE , i.e, (PA,E)n. Ahlswede and Csisza´r [7] showed that
the optimal generation rate
G(PA,E)
:= sup
{(fn,Mn)}
{
lim
n→∞
logMn
n
∣∣∣ lim
n→∞
d1(P
fn(An),En |En) = 0
}
equals the conditional entropy H(A|E). That is, any achiev-
able generation rate R = limn→∞ logMnn is no more than
H(A|E). The quantity d1(P fn(An),En |En) goes to zero. In
order to treat the speed of this convergence, we focus on the
supremum of the exponential rate of decrease (exponent) for
d1(P
fn(An),En |En) for a given R
e1(P
A,E |R)
:= sup
{(fn,Mn)}
{
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log d1(P
fn(An),En |En)
∣∣∣
lim
n→∞
−1
n
logMn ≤ R
}
.
Since the relation φ(t|An|En|(PA,E)n) = nφ(t|A|E|PA,E)
holds, the inequality (68) implies that
e1(P
A,E |R) ≥ −φ(t|A|E|PA,E)− tR. (69)
for t ∈ [0, 1/2]. That is, taking the maximum concerning t ∈
[0, 1/2], we obtain
e1(P
A,E |R) ≥ eφ(A|E|PA,E |R), (70)
where
eφ(A|E|PA,E |R) := max
0≤t≤ 12
−φ(t|A|E|PA,E)− tR
= max
0≤s≤1
−φ( s
1 + s
|A|E|PA,E)− s
1 + s
R.
Since ddtφ(t|PA,E)
∣∣
t=0
= d(sH1+s(A|E|P
A,E)
ds
∣∣∣
s=0
=
−H(A|E), the right hand sides of (70) and (71) are strictly
greater than 1 for R < H(A|E).
B. Comparison with the previous paper [6]
Next, we show how better our bound is than that by the
previous paper [6]. The previous paper [6] shows the following
in Section IIA: there exists a sequence of functions fn : An →
{1, . . . , ⌊enR⌋} such that
lim
n→∞
−1
n
logD(P fn(An),En‖P fn(An)mix × PEn)
≥ max
0≤s≤1
sH1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR,
where we define the function
sH1+s(A|E|PA,E) := − log
∑
a,e
PE(e)PA|E(a|e)1+s
= − log
∑
a,e
PA,E(a, e)1+sPE(e)−s
for s ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, applying Pinsker’s inequality (6), we
obtain
e1(P
A,E |R) ≥ lim
n→∞
−1
n
log d1(P
fn(An),En |En)
≥e˜H(A|E|PA,E |R) (71)
where
e˜H(A|E|PA,E |R) := max
0≤s≤1
sH1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR
2
= max
0≤t≤ 12
tH 1
1−t
(A|E|PA,E)− tR
2− 2t
with s = t1−t . Concerning the comparison of both bounds, we
prepare the following lemma.
Lemma 7: The inequality
− s
1 + s
H1+s(A|E|PA,E) ≥ φ( s
1 + s
|A|E|PA,E) (72)
holds for s ∈ (0,∞). Equality holds if and only if the Re´nyi
entropy H1+s(A|PA|E=e) does not depend on the choice e at
the support of PE .
Proof: Applying Jensen’s inequality to the concave func-
tion x 7→ x 11+s , we have
e−
sH1+s(A|E|P
A,E)
1+s = (
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s) 11+s
≥
∑
e
PE(e)(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s) 11+s = eφ( s1+s |A|E|PA,E).
Thus, the equality condition is that the value∑
a P
A|E(a|e)1+s does not depend on the choice e at
the support of PE . Hence, we obtain the desired argument.
In order to compare the two bounds eφ(A|E|PA,E |R) and
e˜H(A|E|PA,E |R), we introduce the following value:
eH(A|E|PA,E |R) := max
0≤s≤1
sH1+s(A|E|PA,E)− sR
1 + s
= max
0≤t≤ 12
tH 1
1−t
(A|E|PA,E)− tR
Then, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 8:
eφ(A|E|PA,E |R) ≥ eH(A|E|PA,E |R) ≥ e˜H(A|E|PA,E |R)
(73)
for R < H(A|E). Equality in the first inequality holds if
and only if the Re´nyi entropy H1+s0(A|PA|E=e) does not
depend on the choice e at the support of PE for s0 :=
argmax0≤s≤1−φ( s1+s |A|E|PA,E) − s1+sR. Equality in the
second inequality holds if and only if sH2(A|E|P
A,E)−R
2 =
max0≤s≤1
sH1+s(A|E|P
A,E)−sR
1+s .
Therefore, our exponent eφ(A|E|PA,E |R) is strictly better
than the exponent e˜H(A|E|PA,E |R) by [6, Section IIA]
except for the case satisfying the following two conditions: (i)
−φ(12 |A|E|PA,E)− 12R = max0≤s≤1−φ( s1+s |A|E|PA,E)−
s
1+sR. (ii) H2(A|PA|E=e) does not depend on the choice e
at the support of PE .
For example, we consider the following case: A equals
E , the set A has a module structure, (i.e., A is an Abelian
12
group) and the conditional distribution PA|E(a|e) has the form
PA(a−e). Then, the equality condition for the first inequality
holds. Since
eφ(
s
1+s |A|E|P
A,E) =
∑
e
PE(e)(
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s) 11+s
=
∑
e
PE(e)e−
sH1+s(A|P
A)
1+s = e−
sH1+s(A|P
A)
1+s .
and
e−sH1+s(A|E|P
A,E) =
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s
=
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
a
PA(a− e)1+s
=
∑
e
PE(e)e−
sH1+s(A|P
A)
1+s = e−
sH1+s(A|P
A)
1+s ,
bounds eφ(A|E|PA,E |R) and e˜H(A|E|PA,E |R) can be sim-
plified to
eφ(A|E|PA,E |R) = eH(A|E|PA,E |R) = eH(A|PA|R)
e˜H(A|E|PA,E |R) = e˜H(A|PA|R),
where
eH(A|PA|R) := max
0≤s≤1
sH1+s(A|PA)− sR
1 + s
= max
0≤t≤1/2
tH 1
1−t
(A|PA)− tR
e˜H(A|PA|R) := max
0≤s≤1
sH1+s(A|PA)− sR
2
= max
0≤t≤1/2
tH 1
1−t
(A|PA)− tR
2− 2t .
In particular, both exponents are numerically plotted in Fig. 3
when A = {0, 1}, and PA(0) = a, PA(1) = 1− a.
Proof: The first inequality and its equality condition
follow from Lemma 7 and the definitions of eφ(PA,E |R)
and eH(PA,E |R). The second inequality follows from the
inequality 12 ≤ 11+s for s ∈ [0, 1]. Since the equality holds
only when s = 1, we obtain the equality condition for the
second inequality.
VI. THE WIRE-TAP CHANNEL IN A GENERAL FRAMEWORK
Next, we consider the wire-tap channel model, in which
the eavesdropper (wire-tapper) Eve and the authorized receiver
Bob receive the information from the authorized sender Alice.
In this case, in order for Eve to have less information, Alice
chooses a suitable encoding. This problem is formulated as
follows. Let X , Y and Z be the alphabets of Alice, Bob, and
Eve. Then, the main channel from Alice to Bob is described
by WB : x 7→ WBx , and the wire-tapper channel from Alice
to Eve is described by WE : x 7→ WEx . That is, WBx
is the output distribution on Bob’s side with Alice’s input
x, and WEx is the output distribution on Eve’s side with
Alice’s input x. In this setting, in order to send a secret
message in {1, . . . ,M} subject to the uniform distribution,
Alice chooses M distributions Q1, . . . , QM on X , and she
generates x ∈ X subject to Qi when she wants to send the
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Fig. 3. Lower bounds of e1(PAE |R). Thick line: eH (A|PA|R)
(The present paper), Normal line: e˜H(A|PA|R) by [6]), Dashed line:
H2(A|P
A)−sR
2
(direct application of (11) without smoothing). Here, PA
is chosen to be the binary distribution PA(0) = α, PA(1) = 1 − α with
α = 0.200. Then h(α) = H(A) = 0.500, and 2 d(sH1+s(A))
ds
|s=1 −
H2(A) = 0.224.
message i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. Bob prepares M disjoint subsets
D1, . . . ,DM of Y and judges that a message is i if y belongs to
Di. Therefore, the triplet (M, {Q1, . . . , QM}, {D1, . . . ,DM})
is called a code, and is described by Φ. Its performance is
given by the following three quantities. The first is the size
M , which is denoted by |Φ|. The second is the average error
probability ǫB(Φ):
ǫB(Φ)
def
=
1
M
M∑
i=1
WBQi (Dci ),
and the third is Eve’s distinguishability d1(Φ|E):
d1(Φ|E) :=d1(WEΦ × PMmix,WE [Φ])
WEΦ (e) :=
∑
i
1
M
WEQi(e), W
E [Φ](i, e) :=
1
M
WEQi(e).
The quantity d1(Φ|E) gives an upper bound for the proba-
bility that Eve can succeed in distinguishing whether Alice’s
information belongs to a given subset. So, the value can be
regarded as Eve’s distinguishability. In order to calculate these
values, we introduce the following quantity.
φ(t|W, p) := log
∑
y
(∑
x
p(x)(Wx(y))
1/(1−t)
)1−t
.
When the random variable Y takes a continuous value in the
set Y while X takes discrete value, the above definition can
be changed to
φ(t|W, p) := log
∫
Y
(∑
x
p(x)(Wx(y))
1/(1−t)
)1−t
dy.
This definition does not depend on the choice of the measure
on Y . That is, when W˜x(y)f(y) = Wx(y) for a positive
function f ,
φ(t|W, p) = log
∫
Y
(∑
x
p(x)(W˜x(y))
1/(1−t)
)1−t
f(y)dy.
13
As is shown as Lemma 1 of [6], φ(t|W, p) satisfies the
following lemma.
Lemma 9: The function p 7→ eφ(t|W,p) is convex for t ∈
[−1, 0], and is concave for t ∈ [0, 1].
Now, using the function φ(t), we make a code for the
wire-tap channel based on the random coding method. For
this purpose, we make a protocol to share a random number.
First, we generate the random code Φ(Y) with size LM ,
which is described as Φ(Y)(a) = Ya for a = 1, . . . , LM
by using the LM independent and identical random variables
Y = (Y1, . . . , YML) subject to the distribution p on X . Gal-
lager [20] showed that the ensemble expectation of the average
error probability concerning decoding the input message A
is less than (ML)teφ(−t|WB,p) for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 when Bob
applies the maximum likelihood decoder D′(Y) of the code
Φ(Y). After sending the random variable A taking values in
the set with the cardinality ML, Alice and Bob apply the
above universal2 hash functions fX to the random variable
A and generate another piece of data of size M . Here, we
assume that the ensemble {fX} satisfies Condition 2. Then,
Alice and Bob share the random variable fX(A) with size M .
This protocol is denoted by Φ(X,Y)′.
Let E be the random variable of the output of Eve’s
channel WE . When p is the uniform distribution on the set
C := {1, . . . ,ML} and the joint distribution PC,E is given by
PC,E(c, e) := p(c)WEc (e), the equations
eφ(t|P
C,E) =
1
M tLt
∑
e
(∑
a
p(c)(WEc (e))
1
1−t
)1−t
=
eφ(t|W
E ,p)
M tLt
. (74)
hold.
For a given code Φ(Y), we apply the inequality (67) to
Eve’s distinguishability. Then,
EX|Yd1(Φ(X,Y)
′|E) ≤ 3e
φ(t|WE,pmix,Φ(Y))
Lt
(75)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ 12 . The concavity of eφ(t|W
E,p) (Lemma 9)
guarantees that
EX,Yd1(Φ(X,Y)
′|E) ≤3EY e
φ(t|WE ,pmix,Φ(Y))
Lt
≤3e
φ(t|WE,p)
Lt
for 0 ≤ t ≤ 12 .
Now, we make a code for the wire-tap channel by modifying
the above protocol Φ(X,Y)′. First, we choose the distribution
Qi to be the uniform distribution on f−1X {i}. When Alice
wants to send the secret message i, before sending the random
variable A, Alice generates the random number A subject
to the distribution Qi. Alice sends the random variable A.
Bob recovers the random variable A by using the maximum
likelihood decoder D′(Y), and applies the function fX. Then,
Bob decodes Alice’s message i, and this code for wire-tap
channel WB,WE is denoted by Φ(X,Y). Since the ensemble
{fX} satisfies Condition 2 and the secret message i obeys the
uniform distribution on {1, . . . ,M}, this protocol Φ(X,Y)
has the same performance as the above protocol Φ(X,Y)′.
Finally, we consider what code is derived from the above
random coding discussion. Using the Markov inequality, we
obtain
PX,Y{ǫB(Φ(X,Y)) ≤ 3EX,YǫB(Φ(X,Y))} ≥ 2
3
PX,Y{d1(Φ(X,Y)|E) ≤ 3EX,Yd1(Φ(X,Y)|E)} ≥ 2
3
.
Therefore, the existence of a good code is guaranteed in the
following way. That is, we give the concrete performance of
a code whose existence is shown in the above random coding
method.
Theorem 5: There exists a code Φ for any integers L,M ,
and any probability distribution p on X such that |Φ| = M
and
ǫB(Φ) ≤3 min
0≤t≤1
(ML)teφ(−t|W
B ,p),
d1(Φ|E) ≤9 min
0≤t≤ 12
eφ(t|W
E ,p)
Lt
.
In the n-fold discrete memoryless channels WBn and
WEn of the channels WB and WE , the additive equation
φ(t|WBn , p) = nφ(t|WB , p) holds. Thus, there exists a code
Φn for any integers Ln,Mn, and any probability distribution
p on X such that |Φn| = Mn and
ǫB(Φ) ≤3 min
0≤t≤1
(MnLn)
tenφ(−t|W
B ,p),
d1(Φn|E) ≤9 min
0≤t≤ 12
enφ(t|W
E ,p)
Ltn
.
Since limt→0 φ(t|W
E ,p)
t = I(p : W
E), the rate maxp I(p :
WB)− I(p : WE) can be asymptotically attained. Therefore,
when the sacrifice information rate is R, i.e., Ln ∼= enR,
the exponential rate of decrease for Eve’s distinguishability
is greater than
eφ(R|WE , p) := max
0≤t≤1/2
tR− φ(t|WE , p).
VII. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING BOUNDS
In Subsection VII-A, we compare our exponent
eφ(R|WE , p) with those derived by [17], [6] in the
general setting. In Subsections VII-B and VII-C, using
discussion in Subsection V-B, we treat this comparison in
special cases more deeply.
A. General case
Now, we compare the lower obtained bound eφ(R|WE , p)
for the exponential rate of decrease for Eve’s distinguishability
with existing lower bounds [17], [6]. Using the quantity
ψ(t|W, p) := log
∑
y
(∑
x
p(x)(Wx(y))
1+t
)
Wp(y)
−t (76)
Wp(y) :=
∑
x
p(x)Wx(y),
14
the previous paper [17] derived the following lower bound of
this exponential rate of decrease:
eψ(R|WE , p) := max
0≤s≤1
sR− ψ(s|WE , p)
1 + s
= max
0≤t≤1/2
tR− (1− t)ψ( t
1 − t |W
E , p).
(77)
The other previous paper [6] also derived the following lower
bound:
max
0≤s≤1
sR − ψ(s|WE , p) (78)
for the exponential rate of decrease for the mutual information.
By applying a discussion similar to Subsection V-B and
Pinsker’s inequality (9), the bound (78) yields the bound
e˜ψ(R|WE , p) := max
0≤s≤1
sR− ψ(s|WE , p)
2
, (79)
which is smaller than the lower bound eψ(R|WE , p) because
1
2 ≤ 11+s for 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. Hence, in order to show the
superiority of our bound eφ(R|WE , p), it is sufficient to show
the superiority over the bound eψ(R|WE , p).
In the following, we compare the two bounds eφ(R|WE , p)
and eψ(R|WE , p). For this purpose, we treat eφ(t|WE ,p) and
e(1−t)ψ(
t
1−t |W
E ,p) for 0 ≤ t ≤ 12 . The reverse Ho¨lder
inequality [28] for the measurable space (X , p) is
∑
x∈X
p(x)|X(x)Y (x)|
≥(
∑
x∈X
p(x)|X(x)| 11+s )1+s(
∑
x∈X
p(x)|Y (x)|− 1s )−s
for s ≥ 0. Using this inequality, we obtain
∑
y
[∑
x
p(x)(Wx(y))
1+s
]
Wp(y)
−s
≥

∑
y
[∑
x
p(x)(Wx(y))
1+s
] 1
1+s


1+s
·
(∑
y
Wp(y)
−s·− 1s
)−s
=

∑
y
[∑
x
p(x)(Wx(y))
1+s
] 1
1+s


1+s
.
Substituting s = t1−t , we obtain
∑
y
[∑
x
p(x)(Wx(y))
1
1−t
]
Wp(y)
−t
1−t
≥

∑
y
[∑
x
p(x)(Wx(y))
1
1−t
]1−t
1
1−t
,
which implies
e(1−t)ψ(
t
1−t |W
E ,p)
=
(∑
y
[∑
x
p(x)(Wx(y))
1
1−t
]
Wp(y)
−t
1−t
)1−t
≥
∑
y
[∑
x
p(x)(Wx(y))
1
1−t
]1−t
= eφ(t|W
E ,p).
Thus, our bound eφ(R|WE , p) for the exponential rate of
decrease is better than the existing bound eψ(R|WE , p) [17].
Example 1: Assume that X = E = {0, 1}. We consider the
following channel.
W0(0) = α, W0(1) = 1− α, W1(0) = 1− 9α, W1(1) = 9α.
When p(0) = 1/2, p(1) = 1/2,
I(p,W ) =h(1/2− 5α)− (h(α) + h(9α)
2
ψ(t|p,W ) = log
(
(
α1+t + (1− 9α)1+t
2
(
1
2
− 5α)−t
+ (
(9α)1+t + (1− α)1+t
2
(1/2 + 5α)−t)
)
φ(t|p,W ) = log
(
(
α1/(1−t) + (1− 9α)1/(1−t)
2
)1−t
+ (
(9α)1/(1−t) + (1− α)1/(1−t)
2
)1−t
)
.
Then, the three bounds eφ(R|W, p), eψ(R|W, p), and
e˜ψ(R|W, p) with α = 0.05 are numerically compared as in
Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4. Lower bounds of exponent. Thick line: eφ(R|W,p) (The present
paper), Normal line: eψ(R|W,p) [17], Dashed line: e˜ψ(R|W, p) [6]. Here,
α is chosen to be 0.0500. Then, I(p,W ) = 0.119.
B. Additive case
Next, we consider a more specific case. When X = Z and
X is a module and Wx(z) = W0(z − x) = PX(z − x), the
channel W is called additive.
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Since
e(1−t)ψ(
t
1−t |W
E ,pmix) = eφ(t|W
E ,pmix)
=|X |te−tH 11−t (X|P
X)
, (80)
any additive channel WE satisfies
eψ(R|WE , pmix) = eφ(R|WE , pmix)
= max
0≤t≤ 12
t(R− log |X |) + tH 1
1−t
(X |PX))
=eH(X |PX | log |X | −R) (81)
and
e˜ψ(R|WE , pmix) = max
0≤t≤ 12
t(R − log |X |) + tH 1
1−t
(X |PX)
2− 2t
=e˜H(X |PX | log |X | −R)
for the uniform distribution pmix on X .
Hence, our bound eφ(R|WE , pmix) is the same as the
previous bound eψ(R|WE , pmix). However, since 12−2t < 1
for t ∈ [0, 1/2), our bound eφ(R|WE , pmix) is strictly better
than the bound e˜ψ(R|WE , pmix) by the other previous paper
[6] when the maximum is attained by t ∈ [0, 1/2).
C. General additive case
We consider a more general case. Eve is assumed to have
two random variables Z ∈ X and Z ′ ∈ Z ′. The first random
variable Z is the output of an additive channel depending on
the second variable Z ′. That is, the channel WEx (z, z′) can
be written as WEx (z, z′) = PX,Z
′
(z − x, z′), where PX,Z′ is
a joint distribution. Hereafter, this channel model is called a
general additive channel. This channel is also called a regular
channel [21]. For this channel model, we obtain
eφ(s|W
E ,Pmix,X ) =
∑
z,z′
(
∑
x
1
|X |W
E
x (z, z
′)
1
1−s )1−s
=
∑
z,z′
(
∑
x
1
|X |P
X,Z′(z − x, z′) 11−s )1−s
=
1
|X |1−s
∑
z,z′
(
∑
x
PX,Z
′
(−x, z′) 11−s )1−s
=
|X |
|X |1−s
∑
z′
(
∑
x
PX,Z
′
(x, z′)
1
1−s )1−s
=|X |seφ(s|X|Z′|PX,Z
′
), (82)
and
eψ(s|W
E ,pmix)
=
∑
z,z′
(
∑
x
1
|X |W
E
x (z, z
′)1+s)(
∑
x
1
|X |W
E
x (z, z
′))−s
=|X |s−1
∑
z,z′
(
∑
x
PX,Z
′
(z − x, z′)1+s)(
∑
x
PX,Z
′
(z − x, z′))−s
=|X |s−1
∑
z,z′
(
∑
x
PX,Z
′
(−x, z′)1+s)PZ′(z′)−s
=|X |s−1|X |
∑
z′
∑
x
PX,Z
′
(x, z′)1+sPZ
′
(z′)−s
=|X |se−sH1+s(X|Z′|PX,Z
′
). (83)
Then, the equalities
eφ(R|WE , pmix)
= max
0≤t≤ 12
t(R − log |X |)− φ(t|X |Z ′|PX,Z′)
=eφ(X |Z ′|PX,Z′ | log |X | −R), (84)
eψ(R|WE , pmix)
= max
0≤t≤ 12
t(R − log |X |) + tH 1
1−t
(X |Z ′|PX,Z′)
=eH(X |Z ′|PX,Z′ | log |X | −R), (85)
e˜ψ(R|WE , pmix)
= max
0≤t≤ 12
t(R − log |X |) + tH 1
1−t
(X |Z ′|PX,Z′)
2− 2t
=e˜H(X |Z ′|PX,Z
′ | log |X | −R) (86)
hold.
Hence, the observation in Section V-B can be applied to
the comparison among eφ(R|WE , pmix), eψ(R|WE , pmix),
and e˜ψ(R|WE , pmix). Due to Lemma 8, eφ(R|WE , pmix)
is strictly better than eψ(R|WE , pmix) and e˜ψ(R|WE , pmix)
except for the special case mentioned in Lemma 8.
VIII. WIRE-TAP CHANNEL WITH LINEAR CODING
In a practical sense, we need to take into account the
decoding time. For this purpose, we often restrict our codes
to linear codes. In the following, we consider the case
where the sender’s space X has the structure of a module.
When an error correcting code is given as a submodule
C1 ⊂ X and the decoder by the authorized receiver is given
as {Dx}x∈C1 , our code for a wire-tap channel is given as
ΦC1,C2 = (|C1/C2|, {Q[x]}[x]∈C1/C2 , {D[x]}[x]∈C1/C2) based
on a submodule C2 of C1 as follows. The encoding Q[x] is
given as the uniform distribution on the coset [x] := x + C2,
and the decoding D[x] is given as the subset ∪x′∈x+C2Dx′ .
Next, we consider a submodule C2(X) of C1 with cardinality
|C2(X)| = L that is labeled by a random variable X. Then,
the module C2(X) can be regarded as a random variable. Now,
we impose the module C2(X) the following condition.
Condition 4: Any element x 6= 0 ∈ C1 is included in
C2(X) with probability at most L|C1| .
Then, using (75), we can evaluate the performance of the
constructed code in the following way.
Theorem 6: Choose the subcode C2(X) according to Con-
dition 4. We construct the code ΦC1,C2(X) by choosing the
distribution Q[x] to be the uniform distribution on [x] for
[x] ∈ C1/C2(X). Then, we obtain
EXd1(ΦC1,C2(X)|E) ≤3
eφ(t|W
E ,Pmix,C1)
Lt
0 ≤ ∀t ≤ 1
2
,
(87)
where Pmix,S is the uniform distribution on the subset S.
When the channel WE is additive, i.e., WEx (z) = PX(z −
x), the equation φ(t|WE , Pmix,C1+x) = φ(t|WE , Pmix,C1)
holds for any x. Thus, the concavity of eφ(t|WE ,p) (Lemma 9)
implies that
φ(t|WE , Pmix,C1) ≤ φ(t|WE , Pmix,X ). (88)
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Thus, combining (87), (88), and (80), we obtain
EXd1(ΦC1,C2(X)|E) ≤3
|X |te−tH 11−t (X|P )
Lt
(89)
for 0 < t < 12 . That is, when L = e
R
, taking the minimum
concerning 0 < t < 12 , we obtain
EXd1(ΦC1,C2(X)|E) ≤3e−eH(X|P
X | log |X |−R). (90)
When the additive noise obeys the n-fold i.i.d. of P on Xn
and L = enR, we obtain
EXd1(ΦC1,C2(X)|E) ≤3e−neH(X|P
X | log |X |−R). (91)
Similarly, when the channel WE is general additive, i.e.,
WEx (z, z
′) = PX,Z
′
(z−x, z′), combining (87), (88), and (82),
we obtain
EXd1(ΦC1,C2(X)|E) ≤3
|X |teφ(t|X|Z′|PX,Z
′
)
Lt
(92)
for 0 < t < 12 . That is, when L = e
R
, taking the minimum
concerning 0 < t < 12 , we obtain
EXd1(ΦC1,C2(X)|E) ≤3e−eφ(X|Z
′|PX,Z
′
| log |X |−R). (93)
In the n-fold i.i.d. case, when L = enR, we obtain
EXd1(ΦC1,C2(X)|E) ≤3e−neφ(X|Z
′|PX,Z
′
| log |X |−R). (94)
When X is an n-dimensional vector space Fnq over the finite
field Fq, the bound can be attained by the combination of
linear code and the concatenation of a Toeplitz matrix and the
identity (X, I) of the size m×(m−k) [6]. Hence, if the error
correcting code C1 can be realizable, the whole process in the
above code can be realizable.
Remark 1: In the additive case, due to (81), the exponent
of the upper bound given in (91) is the same as that given by
the previous paper [17]. However, the code given in [17] is
constructed by completely random coding. However, the code
given in this section is based on the ordinary linear code.
For security, it requires only the universal hash condition. So,
our construction requires smaller complexity than that given
in [17]. In the general additive case, our exponents (94) is
strictly better than that given in [17], which is calculated in
(85).
Next, we consider the relation with the other previous paper
[6] in the general additive case. The protocol given in [6] is is
quite similar to ours. However, as is shown in Lemma 8, except
for the very special case, our exponent (94) is strictly better
than that given in [6], which is calculated in (86). Remember
that the exponent given in [6] is e˜ψ(R|WE , pmix), which is
mentioned around (79).
IX. SECRET KEY GENERATION WITH PUBLIC
COMMUNICATION
Furthermore, the above result can be applied to secret key
generation (distillation) with one-way public communication,
in which, Alice, Bob, and Eve are assumed to have initial
random variables A ∈ A, B ∈ B, and E ∈ E , respectively.
The task for Alice and Bob is to share a common random
variable almost independent of Eve’s random variable E by
using a public communication. For this purpose, we assume
that Alice and Bob can perform local data processing in the
both sides and Alice can send messages to Bob via public
channel. That is, only one-way communication is allowed. We
call such a combination of these operations a code and denote
it by Φ.
The quality is evaluated by three quantities: the size of the
final common random variable, the probability that their final
variables coincide, and Eve’s distinguishability d1(Φ|E) of the
final joint distribution between Alice and Eve.
In order to construct a protocol for this task, we assume
that the set A has a module structure (any finite set can be
regarded as a cyclic group). Then, the objective of secret
key distillation can be realized by applying the code of a
wire-tap channel as follows. First, Alice generates another
uniform random variable X and sends the random variable
X ′ := X +A. Then, the distribution of the random variables
B,X ′ (E,X ′) accessible to Bob (Eve) can be regarded as the
output distribution of the channel x 7→ WBx (x 7→ WEx ). The
channels WB and WE are given as follows.
WBx (x
′, b) = PA,B(x′ − x, b), WEx (x′, e) = PA,E(x′ − x, e),
(95)
where PAB(a, b) (PAE(a, e)) is the joint probability between
Alice’s initial random variable A and Bob’s (Eve’s) initial
random variable B (E). Hence, the channel WE is general
additive.
Applying Theorem 5 to the uniform distribution PAmix, for
any numbers M and L, due to (82), there exists a code Φ such
that |Φ| =M and 1
ǫB(Φ) ≤ 3 min
0≤s≤1
(ML)s|A|−seφ(−s|A|B|PA,B) (96)
d1(Φ|E) ≤ 9 min
0≤t≤ 12
|A|teφ(t|A|E|PA,E)
Lt
. (97)
In particular, when the joint distribution between A
and B(E) is the n-fold independent and identical distri-
bution (i.i.d.) of PA,B (PA,E), respectively, the relation
φ(t|An|En|(PA,E)n) = nφ(t|A|E|PA,E) hold. Thus, there
exists a code Φn for any integers Ln,Mn, and any probability
distribution p on X such that |Φn| =Mn and
ǫB(Φ) ≤ 3 min
0≤s≤1
(MnLn)
s|A|−nsenφ(−s|A|B|PA,B) (98)
d1(Φn|E) ≤ 9 min
0≤t≤ 12
|A|ntenφ(t|A|E|PA,E)
Ltn
. (99)
Finally, we mention the relation with the previous paper
[17]. Since the above discussion is an application of section
VIII, the same comparison as Remark 1 is valid. Hence, our
evaluation (99) is strictly better than that given in [17] except
for the special case.
1 The previous paper [17, Section VI] derived upper bounds differ-
ent from (96) and (98) while it treat the same protocol. The previ-
ous paper [17, Section VI] erroneously calculated eφ(−s|WB ,Pmix,A)
to |A|−se
−sH 1
1+s
(A|B|PA,B)
. However, the correct calculation is
|A|−seφ(−s|A|B|P
A,B) as is shown in (82).
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X. DISCUSSION
We have derived a tight evaluation of the exponent for
the average of the L1 norm distance between the gener-
ated random number and the uniform random number when
universal2 hash functions are applied and the key generation
rate is less than the critical rate R1. Using this evaluation, we
have obtained an upper bound for Eve’s distinguishability in
secret key generation from a common random number without
communication when universal2 hash functions are applied.
Since our bound is based on the Re´nyi entropy of order 1+ s
for s ∈ [0, 1], it can be regarded as an extension of Bennett et
al [2]’s result with the Re´nyi entropy of order 2.
Applying this bound to the wire-tap channel, we obtain
an upper bound for Eve’s distinguishability, which yields
an exponential upper bound. This exponent improves on the
existing exponent [17]. Further, when the error correction code
is given by a linear code and when the channel is additive
or general additive, the privacy amplification is given by a
concatenation of a Toeplitz matrix and the identity matrix. This
method can be applied to secret key distillation with public
communication.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
First, for a fixed element a ∈ Ω, we introduce the condition
for a hash function fX:
Condition 5 (Condition [a,Ω]):
fX(a) 6= fX(a′) for ∀a′(6= a) ∈ Ω.
Let P [a,Ω] be the probability that Condition [a,Ω] holds. Due
to the strongly universal2 condition, it is evaluated as
1− P [a,Ω] =Pr∪a′( 6=a)∈Ω{fX(a) = fX(a′)}
≤
∑
a′( 6=a)∈Ω
Pr{fX(a) = fX(a′)}
=
∑
a′( 6=a)∈Ω
1
M
=
|Ω|
M
,
which implies that P [a,Ω] ≥ 1 − |Ω|M . When we denote the
expectation concerning the hash funcations under Condition
[a,Ω] by EX|[a,Ω], the strongly universal2 condition yields that
EX|[a,Ω]
(
PA(a) +
∑
a′( 6=a)∈f−1
X
(a)
PA(a′)− 1
M
)
=PA(a) + EX|[a,Ω]
∑
a′( 6=a)∈f−1
X
(a)
PA(a′)− 1
M
=PA(a) +
1
M
∑
a′( 6=a)∈A\Ω
PA(a′)− 1
M
=PA(a) +
1
M
(1− PA(Ω))− 1
M
=PA(a)− 1
M
PA(Ω).
When Conditions [a1,Ω], [a2,Ω], . . . , [ak,Ω] hold for
a1, a2, . . . , ak ∈ Ω, fX(a1), fX(a2), . . . , fX(ak) are different.
Then,
d1(P
fX(A)) ≥
k∑
j=1
∣∣∣PA(aj) + ∑
a′( 6=aj)∈f
−1
X
(aj)
PA(a′)− 1
M
∣∣∣.
Now, we define the random variable Y (a) to be 1 when
Condition [a,Ω] holds. We define it to be 0 otherwise. Then,
d1(P
fX(A))
≥
∑
a∈Ω
Y (a)
∣∣∣PA(a) + ∑
a′( 6=a)∈f−1
X
(a)
PA(a′)− 1
M
∣∣∣.
Therefore, taking the expectation, we can evaluate
EXd1(P
fX(A)) as follows.
EXd1(P
fX(A))
≥
∑
a∈Ω
P [a,Ω]EX|[a,Ω]
∣∣∣PA(a) + ∑
a′( 6=a)∈f−1
X
(a)
PA(a′)− 1
M
∣∣∣
≥
∑
a∈Ω
P [a,Ω]EX|[a,Ω]
(
PA(a) +
∑
a′( 6=a)∈f−1
X
(a)
PA(a′)− 1
M
)
=
∑
a∈Ω
(1 − |Ω|
M
)
(
PA(a)− 1
M
PA(Ω)
)
=(1 − |Ω|
M
)(PA(Ω)− |Ω|
M
PA(Ω)) = (1− |Ω|
M
)2PA(Ω).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
We choose s(R) such that d(sH1+s(A|P ))ds |s=s(R) =
H(P1+s(R)) + D(P1+s(R)‖P ) = R, where P1+s(a) :=
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P (a)1+s∑
a′ P (a
′)1+s . When Q satisfies H(Q) +D(Q‖P ) = R,
D(Q‖P )−D(P1+s‖P )
=
∑
a
Q(a)(logQ(a)− logP (a))
−
∑
a
P (a)1+s∑
a′ P (a
′)1+s
(log
P (a)1+s∑
a′ P (a
′)1+s
− logP (a))
=
∑
a
Q(a)(logQ(a)− log P (a)
1+s∑
a′ P (a
′)1+s
)
+
∑
a
(Q(a)− P (a)
1+s∑
a′ P (a
′)1+s
)
· (log P (a)
1+s∑
a′ P (a
′)1+s
− logP (a))
=D(Q‖P1+s) + s
∑
a
(Q(a)− P (a)
1+s∑
a′ P (a
′)1+s
) logP (a)
=D(Q‖P1+s)
+ s(H(P1+s) +D(P1+s‖P )−H(Q) +D(Q‖P ))
=D(Q‖P1+s) ≥ 0.
Hence,
min
Q:H(Q)+D(Q‖P )=R
H(Q) + 2D(Q‖P )−R
= min
Q:H(Q)+D(Q‖P )=R
D(Q‖P ) = D(P1+s(R)‖P )
=sH1+s(A|P ) − s(R)d(sH1+s(A|P ))
ds
|s=s(R)
=sH1+s(A|P ) − s(R)R = max
0≤s
sH1+s(A|P )− sR.
The last equation follows from the concavity of sH1+s(A|P )
concerning s.
Assume that d(sH1+s(A|P ))ds |s=1 ≤ R. Then, s(R) ≤ 1.
When R′ ≥ R,
min
Q:H(Q)+D(Q‖P )=R′
H(Q) + 2D(Q‖P )−R
=max
0≤s
sH1+s(A|P )− sR+R′ −R
≥sH1+s(R)(A|P )− s(R)R′ +R′ −R
≥sH1+s(R)(A|P )− s(R)R
=max
0≤s
sH1+s(A|P )− sR
= max
0≤s≤1
sH1+s(A|P )− sR,
which implies (59).
Assume that d(sH1+s(A|P ))ds |s=1 > R. When R′ ≥ R,
min
Q:H(Q)+D(Q‖P )=R′
H(Q) + 2D(Q‖P )−R
=max
0≤s
sH1+s(A|P )− sR+R′ −R
≥1H1+1(A|P )−R′ +R′ −R = H2(A|P )−R.
Further, when R′ = d(sH1+s(A|P ))ds |s=1,
min
Q:H(Q)+D(Q‖P )=R′
H(Q) + 2D(Q‖P )−R
=H1+1(A|P )−R′ +R′ −R = H2(A|P )−R,
which implies (60).
Further, the concavity of s 7→ sH1+s(A|P ) and
the condition d(sH1+s(A|P ))ds |s=1 > R imply that
max0≤s≤1 sH1+s(A|P ) − sR = H2(A|P ) − R. Thus,
we obtain (61).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF (37)
First, we consider the the minimum
minP˜A:Hmin(A|P˜A)≥R′ d1(P
A, P˜A), where P˜A is chosen
to be a subdistribution satisfying Hmin(A|P˜A) ≥ R′.
min
P˜A:Hmin(A|P˜A)≥R′
d1(P
A, P˜A)
= min
P˜A:Hmin(A|P˜A)≥R′
∑
a∈A
|PA(a)− P˜A(a)|
=
∑
a∈A:PA(a)>e−R′
(PA(a)− e−R)
≥1
2
∑
a∈A:PA(a)>2e−R′
PA(a) =
1
2
PA{PA(a) > 2e−R′}.
Using this relation, we have
min
ǫ
(M
1
2 e−
Hmin,ǫ(A|(P
A)
2 + 2ǫ)
=min
R′
min
P˜A:Hmin(A|P˜A)≥R′
(M
1
2 e−R
′/2 + 2d1(P
A, P˜A))
=min
R′
(M
1
2 e−R
′/2 + PA{PA(a) > 2e−R′}). (100)
Using (29), we obtain
lim
n→∞
−1
n
logmin
R′
(e
nR−nR′
2 + (PA)2{(PA)n(a) > 2e−nR′})
=max
R′
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log(e
nR−nR′
2 + (PA)2{(PA)n(a) > 2e−nR′})
=max
R′
min(R′ −R,max
0≤s
sH1+s(A|PA)− sR′)
=max
R′
max
0≤s
min(R′ −R, sH1+s(A|PA)− sR′)
=max
0≤s
max
R′
min(R′ −R, sH1+s(A|PA)− sR′). (101)
Since sH1+s(A|PA)− sR′ is monotonically decreasing with
R′ and R′−R is monotonically increasing with R′, the max-
imum maxR′ min(R′ − R, sH1+s(A|PA) − sR′) is realized
when R′ − R = sH1+s(A|PA) − sR′, which implies that
R′ = R+2sH1+s(A|P
A)
1+2s . Hence,
max
0≤s
max
R′
min(R′ −R, sH1+s(A|PA)− sR′)
=max
0≤s
sH1+s(A|PA)− sR
1 + 2s
. (102)
Therefore, combining (100), (101), and (102), we
obtain (37) because max0≤s sH1+s(A|P
A)−sR
1+2s =
max0≤t≤1
tH1/(1−t)(A|P
A)−tR
1+t .
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